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“All Wrong in Point of Political Economy”: Attempting to Salvage the Oikos from the Polis in Bleak House
Abstract
This paper proposes that Dickens’s Bleak House is symptomatic of a so-called social realm, in which neither oikos
nor polis exists as a distinct, autonomous entity; therefore, neither can offer sanctuary or adequately discharge the
historical role of the household – maintaining life. In this zone of indistinction, the symbolic structures of London’s
law have become the city’s physical structures, leading to symptoms like Jo the outlaw, whose illness and death is
attributed to the failure of both the polis and the oikos – the city’s legal housekeeping and the law-as-house,
respectively – to maintain life. London’s law has become so immanent that it takes on the role of religion, thus
precluding God’s transcendence. Ultimately, the novel recoils from London’s threatening presence and attempts to
inter the nineteenth-century anxieties associated with the city – anxieties centering around the law both as structure
and religion – through redemptive repetition: Bleak House attempts to wrest the oikos from the clutches of the polis.
But despite the novel’s efforts, as the divisions between oikos and polis collapse, it is ultimately impossible for
either sphere to retain any semblance of itself. As a result, retreat from the polis to the oikos is impossible: there are
no longer well-defined domains – of oikos or polis – into which to retreat in the growing indistinction of the social
realm.
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I.

Introduction

This essay takes its name from what would seem to be a throwaway comment made by none other than Harold
Skimpole. When describing his “family department,” specifically his daughter marrying “another child, and having
two more,” he offhandedly notes that this occurrence is “all wrong in point of political economy” (Dickens 2008, p.
625).1 Of course, this statement could be attributed to nothing more than the self-proclaimed child of the novel
lamenting his child-like family’s inability to produce wealth in a mature, capitalist manner. Yet I think there is more
at stake in this moment than Skimpole’s family department. For in Bleak House – a novel which revolves around the
machinations of the political through its agent, the law – to be “all wrong in point of political economy” calls into
question the terms “political” and “economy,” as well as the implications of the two terms when placed in proximity
to one another.
The origin of the word “economy,” as Dotan Leshem explains,
can be traced back to the Greek word oikonomia (oikonoµia), which in turn is composed of two
words: oikos, which is usually translated as “household”; and nemein, which is best translated as
“management and dispensation.” Thus, the cursory story usually goes, the term oikonomia referred
to “household management…” (2016, p. 225)
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All subsequent references to this edition appear in the text.
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In this passage, we see that “economy” takes its meaning from the private sphere of the oikos; significantly, Leshem
goes on to note that “it seems as if the tacit assumption in writings during this time [circa 700 BCE] was that all of
life that mattered took place within the bounds of one’s oikos” (2016, p. 226). Within the oikos, the “driving force
was life itself”; specifically, the private household realm was charged with the “maintenance of life” (Arendt 2013,
pp. 117; 116). For classically, life was managed in the private realm of the oikos in order to “facilitate the
engagement of the head of the household in philosophy and politics” – in other words, the polis (the realm of
politics) and its laws are created only as a result of the proper management of the oikos as its own self-contained
administrative and manufacturing unit: engagement in public life was only secondary to private management and
dispensation (Leshem 2016, p. 229). As Hannah Arendt states, even when household management was described in
the sense of “government,” it was taken to be “prepolitical and to belong in the private rather than the public
sphere”; politics is not possible without first “mastering the necessities of life in the household” (2013, pp. 118;
117).
But not so in the emerging legalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Dickens is indebted to the
logic which predates him: the proliferation of legalistic (and discursive) mechanisms of the eighteenth century.
Kieran Dolin, in particular, describes the way in which legality’s codification in eighteenth-century England resulted
in “a proliferation of new ways of speaking about crime, both in the literary forms for representing it and in the legal
forms for naming and punishing it” (2007, p. 121). Likewise, Michel Foucault writes that in the eighteenth century
there was the emergence of life-as-metric: that is, life not as a pure form of existence within the household, but the
institutionally-determined life qualified through the metric of “population” (1978. p. 25). “Governments perceived,”
Foucault tells us, “that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a ‘people’” (1978, p. 25). Rather,
they were dealing with the phenomena which characterized an institutionally qualified life outside that of any
individual oikos: “birth and death rates, fertility, state of health,” etc. (1978, p. 25). The nineteenth century, then,
picking up on and developing the previous century’s concerns, implemented legal measures such as the Poor Law
Amendment Act (1834), the Factory Act (1847), and the Public Health Act (1848) – all of which were interested in
maintaining and improving life in the public sphere rather than the private sphere of the home (Heady 2006, p. 316).
Social welfare apparatuses, too, such as charities, created a “dense network of self-governing social institutions that
encircled the citizen at every level” (Goodlad 2003, p. 7).
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In short, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked a shift from life as maintained by the household to
life as maintained (and persistently tracked) by the polis, the realm of governance and government––a shift which
entirely altered the classical mode of thought pertaining to life’s maintenance. Within this realm of governmentally
fostered life, it is no wonder that eighteenth and nineteenth century literature was obsessed with the discursive
mechanisms of law, crime, punishment: the new realm of life’s maintenance was not the oikos but the polis, not
household management but legal and political management. The legacy which Dickens inherits from the eighteenth
century is not one of life maintained by the oikos. It is a legacy of produced life, managed life, politically qualified
and politically fostered life. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there is a significant deviation from the
historical primacy of the private realm in life’s management. In the intermingling of the public and the private, the
laws of the polis have been substituted for the traditional role of the household.
In terms of “political economy,” then, we see that there would have been a classical antinomy between the
words “political” and “economy” that no longer holds for the nineteenth century: “the very term ‘political economy’
would have been [historically] a contradiction in terms: whatever was ‘economic,’ related to the life of the
individual and the survival of the species, was a non-political, household affair by definition” (Arendt 2013, p. 117).
The contradiction in terms formalized by the phrase “political economy” is at the heart of Bleak House, as well as
the nineteenth century as a whole (inheriting its anxieties from the eighteenth century). For in Bleak House, life is no
longer, in many cases, maintained by the oikos. Rather, the novel is symptomatic of what Arendt describes as a
“nation-wide administration of housekeeping,” or “collective housekeeping,” in which “all matters pertaining
formerly to the private sphere of the family have become a collective concern”: economic activities now pertain to
the public, rather than the private, realm (2013, pp. 116; 119). It is the emergence of this realm – a realm neither
private nor public, which Arendt calls the “social realm” – which is, if anything, the idea with which Bleak House is
preoccupied (2013, p. 116). In the nineteenth-century London of Bleak House, whether the private and the public
can ultimately regain the classical meanings they lost – in other words, whether the oikos can be salvaged from the
polis – is one of the novel’s principal questions.
My thesis, then, in its most general terms, is that in the indistinction of the social realm, neither oikos nor
polis exists as a distinct, autonomous entity; therefore, neither can offer sanctuary or adequately discharge the
historical role of the household – maintaining life. In this zone of indistinction, the symbolic structures of London’s
law have become the city’s physical structures, leading to symptoms like Jo the outlaw, whose illness and death, I
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suggest, can be attributed to the failure of both the polis and the oikos – the city’s legal housekeeping and the lawas-house, respectively – to maintain life. Additionally, London’s law has become so immanent that it takes on the
role of religion, thus precluding God’s transcendence. Ultimately, though, Dickens recoils from London’s
threatening presence and attempts to inter the anxieties associated with the city – anxieties centering around the law
both as structure and religion – through a sort of redemptive repetition: Dickens attempts to wrest the oikos from the
clutches of the polis. But despite Dickens’s efforts, as the divisions between oikos and polis collapse, it is ultimately
impossible for either sphere to retain any semblance of itself. As a result, retreat from the polis to the oikos is
impossible: there are no longer well-defined domains – of oikos or polis – into which to retreat in the growing
indistinction of the social realm. As Skimpole’s description of “political economy” exemplifies, in Bleak House’s
London there truly is something “all wrong in point of political economy” – something which ultimately cannot be
redeemed at the novel’s end.
II.

London’s Structures; Or, Life Outside the Law

The understanding that the social realm’s growing indistinction is depicted in Bleak House, while not stated in so
many words, is far from groundbreaking; the intermingling of the public and the private within the novel has
become an axiomatic reading. As Barbara Gottfried explains, “What is crucial in the novel is not simply the
pervasiveness of the law, as the metaphor of Chancery would suggest, but the interpenetration of the domestic realm
by the public realm in the form of the law, which under the guise of settling intra-familial disputes over money,
overwhelms and appropriates that domestic realm” (1994, pp. 7-8). Similarly, Pam Morris notes that “men like
Tulkinghorn,” which I take to mean the representatives of the law’s shadowy power, “embody the entire absorption
of the private into the public office” (2001, p. 688). Morris goes on to say that “In this way the public and the private
domains again merge dangerously and invisibly into each other” (2001, p. 690).2 Similarly, a great deal of critical
work has been done pertaining to legality’s role in Bleak House. Maria Ioannou, for one, connects the beneficent
aspects of the law with the emerging field of “jurisprudential inquiry – the study of the role, content, form, and
quality of the law – which was gaining ground in nineteenth-century Britain and in Victorian legal thought” (2020,
p. 131). Kieran Dolin, too, writes convincingly about Bleak House’s role in legal history, particularly its reformist
emphasis on the concept of “equity” in the law, positing Esther’s domestic world-building and narrative “progress”
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The notions of the “home” and domesticity in Bleak House have been thoroughly explored by critics. For powerful
accounts of the “national home” in Bleak House, particularly in relation to colonialism, see Lorentzen 2004 and
Carens 1998. For an account of the gendering of the home, see Danahay 1991.
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as a rejoinder to Chancery’s injustices (1999, pp. 71-96).3 I find these readings valid interpretations of the novel’s
overt preoccupation: the integration of the private and the public, the domestic and the law. However, I would also
suggest that within these readings we find a missing element: that of the role of law as structure. Yes, as Gottfried
maintains, the “interpenetration of the domestic realm by the public realm in the form of law” has “overwhelm[ed]
and appropriate[d] the domestic realm,” but she neglects to push this point to the full extent required by the text: the
structure of law has entirely superseded the domestic realm, so much so that law has become the domestic realm’s
very structure. In this way, the structure of the law becomes analogous to the structure of the home – both, albeit
somewhat inadequately in London, “house life.”4
The analogy between symbolic and physical structure is perhaps best exemplified by Richard Carstone,
who twice refers to the Chancery suit as “an unfinished house,” saying to Esther, “If you lived in an unfinished
house, you couldn’t settle down in it; if you were condemned to leave everything you undertook, unfinished, you
would find it hard to apply yourself to anything; and yet that’s my unhappy case” (342). And again, Richard tells
Esther, “If you were living in an unfinished house, liable to have the roof put on or taken off – to be from top to
bottom pulled down or built up – to-morrow, next day, next week, next month, next year – you would find it hard to
rest or settle” (551). Aside from the syntactical changes indicating Richard’s increasing entrenchment in the law (“If
you lived” vs. “If you were living”), we see in these instances not only the idea of law as a physical, “lived in”
structure, but the concept of the “house of law” as unfinished, lacking, open to the elements. The law which has
become house cannot protect its occupants from the dangers of the polis outside; indeed, the house itself is
constantly exposed to the threat of the external – the roof being “put off,” as it were.
The threat of the external is also apparent in the “eyes in the shutters” which look on Nemo’s death within
the household (152). Not only has the structure superseded life to the degree of taking on life-like characteristics, but
the structure has become more life-like than life itself: it can “see” while the eyes of those inside it are forever
closed. In this way, structures take on a life of their own, ultimately seeking “to transform [themselves] entirely into
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See, too, Sally Ledger’s chapter which nods toward law as the “mechanism of the state” (2007, p. 201).
Anna Kornbluh, theorizing Bleak House through the concept of the limit, describes the link between the home and
the law as one of formalization and social structuration: the house gives form to the “impossible function” of law.
The house, then, is the limit which both constructs social space, making it legible, and reveals that political
formalism thrives not on formlessness but on the forms which enable life (2019, p. 87). “When the elemental
structuration troped by the house breaks down,” Kornbluh argues, “the law is exposed in its disorder, the social in its
injustice” (94). I take a different approach. Rather than the decaying house exposing law, I argue for a house that is
law – in the sense that it is charged with housing life. The tragedy of the novel lies in the house of law’s inability to
perform that very task.
4
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life” (Agamben 1998, p. 185). Furthermore, eyes in shutters make it apparent that there can be no true privacy now
that the law has become house: there are even prying eyes in the structure meant to cover the windows. In these
respects, the law-as-house, though charged with the duty of the household – the maintenance of life – cannot
discharge that duty, and therefore, as seen in the cases of both Richard and Nemo, cannot maintain the lives of those
dwelling within. Consequently, Richard and Nemo both die within the structure of law, which has attempted, and
failed, to replicate the oikos. Even when within the unfinished house’s structure, one finds oneself outside the law’s
ability to maintain life.
But what about those who are both literally and symbolically outside the structure? Jo, for instance, who
has no access to structures other than Tom-all-alone’s, the “ruined” shelter characterized, like Richard’s “unfinished
house,” by the “gaps in walls…where the rain drips in” (235; 236). But, unlike Richard’s merely unfinished house,
Tom-all-alone’s is a decaying house: “Twice, lately, there has been a crash and a cloud of dust…and, each time, a
house has fallen” (235; 236). So if Richard and Nemo’s lives cannot be maintained within the structure of the
unfinished house, what implications does this have for Jo, dwelling, if dwelling it can be called, in a structure so
decayed it cannot even stand? Who, as a result, must primarily reside in London’s streets? In attempting to answer
this question, I need to quote a significant portion of the text in full:
It must be strange to be like Jo… It must be very puzzling to see the good company going to the
churches on Sundays, with their books in their hands, and to think (for perhaps Jo does think, at
odd times) what does it all mean, and if it means anything to anybody, how comes it that it means
nothing to me? To be hustled, and jostled, and moved on; and really to feel that it would appear to
be perfectly true that I have no business, here, or there, or anywhere; and yet to be perplexed by
the consideration that I am here somehow, too, and everybody overlooked me until I became that
creature that I am! It must be a strange case, not merely to be told that I am scarcely human (as in
the case of my offering myself for a witness), but to feel it of my own knowledge all my life! To
see the horses, dogs, and cattle, go by me, and to know that in ignorance I belong to them, and not
to the superior beings in my shape, whose delicacy I offend! Jo’s ideas of a Criminal Trial, or a
Judge, or a Bishop, or a Government, or that inestimable jewel to him (if he only knew it) the
Constitution, should be strange! His whole material and immaterial life is wonderfully strange; his
death, the strangest thing of all. (236-27)
Here we see that if being inside the structure cannot maintain life, then being outside the structure, in addition to
being devoid of even a semblance of oikonomia, is to be “scarcely human,” it is to not be alive in the first place: “Jo
lives—that is to say, Jo has not yet died…” (235). Even more interestingly, when Dickens writes, “It must be a
strange case, not merely to be told that I am scarcely human (as in the case of my offering myself for a witness),” we
see that being within the law, in this case being a witness at an inquest, is what constitutes humanity; law qualifies
life instead of life qualifying law. Jo, though, is an “outlaw”: he is, quite literally, outside the law (235). And thus
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that extra-legal “creature” Jo, because he cannot know a “Criminal Trial, or a Judge, or a Bishop, or a Government,
or that inestimable jewel to him (if only he knew it) the Constitution,” instead belongs to the “horses, dogs, and
cattle.” In these aforementioned instances we see that in Jo, a law seeking to qualify life is confronted with a life, to
use the term loosely, which can only be qualified as a “living dead man” (Agamben 2013a, p. 156; Agamben 1998,
p. 186).
Trapped in a liminal state which constitutes neither life nor death, one would not be surprised to find that Jo
is ill. Illness is also characterized by liminality, as illness bridges life and death, thus being located somewhere
between both – in a zone of indistinction, so to speak. With this in mind, then, I suggest that Jo’s liminal illness is a
symptom of the social realm’s macrocosmic liminality: Jo’s illness highlights that the social realm – caught between
private and public, oikos and polis – cannot maintain life. Additionally, illness reveals “something rotten” in the
polis’s law, something which manifests itself at the level of the body itself, as the body is the locus of political
power (Benjamin 1986, p. 286). Because the body is intrinsically linked with power’s techniques, the rotten body
reveals the rotten nature of the law itself. Illness strips symbolic glory from the body, allowing the real – the rotten
body of law – to be exposed. And law, which is so dependent upon the glorified displays of power and symbolic
adornment – the wigs and gowns, as it were – cannot afford to be stripped of, or, indeed, for its subjects to be
stripped of, these accoutrements. The trappings of glory form the basis of the law’s power: without regalia, the law
is only a rotting body – Jo’s rotting body. So Jo’s illness poses a threat to the polis, as having a figure devoid of
symbolic pomp in the midst of a city so dependent upon symbolic structures threatens to expose the limitations of
those same structures charged with maintaining life. Thus, Jo must be “moved on” by the physical representations of
the law’s nebulous power: the constable in chapter nineteen and later Inspector Bucket. Jo must be “moved on” by
the representatives of law because Jo’s illness ultimately reveals that the polis’s laws cannot house life, so much so
that they have, in actuality, abandoned life. The constable and Inspector Bucket force Jo to “move on” in order for
life to keep revolving around the fantasy that life can be housed, and thus maintained, within the law so
characterized by indistinction.
Paradoxically, though, while Jo’s illness threatens the law, his illness is also a direct result of the law of the
polis’s inability to recreate the household; in other words, Jo threatens, but is simultaneously threatened by, the law.
So if Jo is an outlaw, but also a subject of law, then what are we to make of him? Here I think that Jo’s description
in the aforementioned extended quotation, particularly the repetition of the word “strange” – appearing five times
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throughout the paragraph (“It must be strange to be like Jo”; “It must be a strange case”; “Jo’s ideas… should be
strange”; “His whole material and immaterial life is wonderfully strange; his death, the strangest thing of all”) –
can help us. Specifically, the word “strange” had multiple meanings which were in use before the nineteenth
century, two of which may help to elucidate Jo’s relation to the law. Firstly, strange was historically used in the
sense of being “external”; secondly, strange was glossed as “exceptional” (“‘Strange,’ OED Online”). Jo, as an
“outlaw,” is both external and exceptional: he is outside the law because he has been excepted from that very law.
But instead of Jo’s exceptional life being an aberration, in Bleak House’s London we see that law is characterized by
this very space of exception; in fact, the multitude of structures which cannot maintain life – from Richard’s
unfinished house, to the decaying houses of Tom-all-alone’s – illustrate that the exception has become the rule.
Here, we see that Jo’s strange life exemplifies a macrocosmic paradox: that of the law as an inclusive exception
(Agamben 2013b, p. 139). For in Jo’s paradoxical existence, there is only extra-legality; Jo’s life is included in the
law only in its capacity to be both external to, and excepted from, that very law.5
Yet though excepted from the law, Jo’s life is still entirely subject to, and indeed defined by, legality:
indeed, “no life…is more political” – or legal – “than his” (Agamben 1998, p. 184). Jo’s subjection to legality is
particularly apparent in instances of Jo being “moved on” by the representatives of the polis’s laws, and, more
specifically, in the omnipresent threat of death (and eventually, actual death) which results from this “moving on.”
However, in the same way that the law is characterized by an inclusive exclusion, Jo’s legality is entirely extralegal: his life is legally qualified only in its ability to be unqualified, as seen in Jo’s inability to bear witness at the
inquest. Indeed, I contend that Jo’s strange life is included in law only through the ban; that is to say, when life is
included in this ban, it is only included in the sense of both banishment from the law and abandonment to the law
(Agamben 1998, p. 181). I also find it worth noting, to momentarily return to the importance of Jo’s “strangeness,”
that “strange,” when used as a verb, historically meant “to banish” (“‘Strange,’ OED Online”). With this in mind,
then, Jo’s so-called legality reflects a law which is neither inclusive nor exclusive, but rather inclusive only in its
capacity to exclude. Thus, Jo’s legal extra-legality and the law’s inclusive exclusion prevent Jo’s life from being
housed within the oikos, the law-as-structure, or, indeed, the polis, characterized by an inadequate system of legal
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Jo’s life is what Agamben might call “bare life” – the “natural life” that, in the classical world, was “politically
neutral and belonged to God as ‘creaturely life.’” Bare life, as distinct from politically qualified life, is that which is
only included in the polis through its exclusion from the polis – that is, by excluding its zoē (natural or bare life) in
the figure of the politically qualified citizen. Jo has no such claim to citizenship – his bare life lingers in the polis as
sympom of the decaying house of law which cannot maintain life (Agamben 2013a, p. 153).
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housekeeping; in the social realm, both the home and the city have been imbued with the other’s qualities, thus
precluding retreat to either. Jo, as Dickens describes, truly has “no business, here, or there, or anywhere” in the
growing indistinction of the social realm (236).6
But to again return to London’s structures, my final point concerns, aptly, brickmakers. Esther, when pressganged into joining Mrs. Pardiggle in her visit to the brickmaker’s house in St. Albans, finds
it was one of a cluster of wretched hovels in a brickfield, with pigsties close to the broken
windows, and miserable little gardens before the doors, growing nothing but stagnant pools. Here
and there, an old tub was put to catch the droppings of rain-water from the roof, or they were
banked up with mud into a little pond like a dirt-pie. (118)
It would seem, then, that those employed to create London’s very structure are themselves not included in the
structure – the broken windows and roofs testify, quite literally, to the threat of the external, as we have previously
seen in Richard’s “unfinished house” and Tom-all-alone’s. The lives which should be, ideally, the structure’s
foundation – in both the sense of physically creating the structure’s bricks, as well as being that in which the
symbolic structure of law should have its basis – are themselves included in the structure only in their exclusion
from that very structure. As with Jo, we see lives which are included in neither polis nor oikos, in any proper sense,
but held in a zone of indistinction – allowed neither membership to nor retreat from either realm. Though the
brickmakers’ “houses” are outside London, they cannot truly escape the polis, nor seek refuge in the oikos. Their
ruined homes are still intertwined with the city’s symbolic structures, so much so that they, too, are subject to the
“nation-wide administration of housekeeping” which, as Jenny’s dead child testifies, cannot do the job of the oikos.
Unsettlingly, in the emerging indistinction of the social realm, it seems that neither oikos nor polis can truly provide
sanctuary.
III.

Expecting Judgment

This portion of the essay, as one might expect, heavily concerns Miss Flite, the “little mad old woman in a squeezed
bonnet, who is always in court, from its sitting to its rising, and always expecting some incomprehensible judgment
to be given in her favor” (13). Miss Flite, as she repeatedly tells us throughout the novel, is waiting expectantly for
the Lord Chancellor to confer judgment upon her cause in the Court of Chancery. Significantly, to describe her
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Agamben writes that politicizing one’s life renders one “self-sufficient,” that is, “capable of taking part in the
polis.” Yet in Bleak House, “self-sufficiency” takes on an elusive and unattainable quality. The tragedy of Jo’s bare
life – included in the polis only through its exclusion from the polis – is that it is only “politicized” in the sense of
being subject to the institutions which should, ideally, house his life. Yet in the zone of indistinction created by
Bleak House’s social realm, self-sufficiency is merely the fantasy, rather than the reality, of political life (2015, p.
203).
9

longing for judgment, Miss Flite says: “I expect a Judgment. Shortly” (524). This telling use of a capital “J” evokes
the thought of that other capital letter which confers so much meaning: the capital “G” of God. It is in this phrase
that we see the role of London’s law – judgment has been conflated with Judgment, and the law has taken on, to all
intents and purposes, the mystified significance of a religion. As D.A. Miller eloquently states, “The suit’s effective
suspension of teleology is, of course, scandalously exemplary of a whole social sphere that seems to run on the
principle of a purposiveness without purpose” (1983, p. 74).7 Might we not apply this notion – the “suspension of
teleology” and “purposiveness without purpose” – not only to the law as exemplary of a “social sphere,” but to the
law as exemplary of a religion, as well? In making this point, I am chiefly drawing on Miss Flite’s conversation with
Esther concerning Miss Flite’s expectation of Judgment, which I quote below in full:
‘My father expected a Judgment,” said Miss Flite. ‘My brother. My sister. They all
expected a Judgment. The same that I expect.”
‘They are all—’
‘Ye-es. Dead of course, my dear,’ said she.
As I saw she would go on, I thought it best to try to be serviceable to her by meeting the
theme, rather than avoiding it.
‘Would it not be wiser,’ said I, ‘to expect this Judgment no more?’
‘Why, my dear,’ she answered promptly, ‘of course it would!’
‘And to attend the court no more?’
‘Equally, of course,’ said she. ‘Very wearing to be always in expectation of what never
comes, my dear Fitz Jarndyce! Wearing, I assure you, to the bone!’
She slightly showed me her arm, and it was fearfully thin indeed.
‘But, my dear,’ she went on, in her mysterious way, ‘there’s a dreadful attraction in the
place. Hush! Don’t mention it to our diminutive friend [Charley], when she comes in. Or it may
frighten her. With good reason. There’s a cruel attraction in the place. You can’t leave it. And you
must expect.’ (522-23)8
Miss Flite is “always in expectation of what never comes.” The idea of suspension, of waiting for the event which
will retroactively confer meaning on the past is not so much a judicial principle but a religious one. Indeed, it
harkens back to Miss Barbary’s invocation of Mark 13:35-7 (‘“Watch ye therefore! lest coming suddenly he find
you sleeping. And what I say unto you, I say unto all, Watch!”’), a passage describing the second coming of Christ
(28). Miss Flite’s need to attend court, lest they should pass Judgment without her, almost perfectly parallels the
sentiments expressed by Miss Barbary. Christianity is founded upon the principle that the “present history of
humanity is…an interim founded on the delay of the Kingdom” (Agamben 2011, p. 7). In this respect, Christianity is
much like the Chancery suit itself: “Everything postponed to that imaginary time! Everything held in confusion and
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Kantian thought is being invoked by Miller, here. Thanks to Carolyn Dever for this point.
Miss Flite goes on to describe how her father was drawn into the case, and how, significantly, “home was drawn
with him” (523). After home had been displaced by the law, both her father and brother died, her sister became
involved, presumably, in prostitution, and Miss Flite herself became ill.
8
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indecision until then!” (554). As Richard says, “There’s no now for us suitors” – there is, it would seem, merely an
interim (551).
So London’s law has taken on the role of religion.9 Additionally, the role of the Lord Chancellor himself, as
Kathleen Blake tells us, is historically religious: when instituting the Court of Chancery, the king decreed that his
bishop – the Lord Chancellor – should oversee this legal institution (Blake 1997, p. 5). But to push the religious
significance of the Lord Chancellor even further, I argue that the Chancellor has replaced God in London.
Specifically, the Chancellor is described as having a “foggy glory round his head, softly fenced in with crimson
cloth and curtains” – does this not evoke the image of haloed God (12)? And in turn, I posit that the idea of the Lord
Chancellor as London’s God exemplifies the law’s immanence in London. In order to expand upon this idea, it will
be helpful, I think, first to discuss the death of that other Lord Chancellor in his other Court of Chancery: Krook.
Specifically, Krook’s spontaneous combustion, an issue which has been at the heart of literary debate since its
publishing in December 1852, can perhaps shed light on the notion of the law’s immanence. Many critics, such as
Brooke D. Taylor, attribute Krook’s combustion (rather vaguely) to his symbolic association with the “allconsuming Court of Chancery,” and describe Krook himself as the “self-consuming embodiment of the legal
system” (Taylor 2010, p. 172). And Daniel Hack asserts, even more nebulously, that “The associative logic by
which the narrator’s allegorization proceeds is relatively straightforward, since Krook has already been identified
with the Lord Chancellor, the invoked analogy between physical and social body is a familiar one, and corruption
finds itself at home in both biological and political contexts” (Hack 1999, pp. 135-36). D.A. Miller, though, provides
a more concrete reading of Krook’s death. He writes:
Repeatedly, the court induces in the narration a wish for its wholesale destruction by fire…The wish,
moreover, may be considered fulfilled (albeit also displaced) when Mr. Krook, who has personified
the Chancellor and Chancery from the first, dies of spontaneous combustion. It is as though
apocalyptic suddenness were the only conceivable way to put an end to Chancery's meanderings,
violent spontaneity the only means to abridge its elaborate procedures, and mere combustion the
only response to its accumulation of paperwork. (61)
Here Miller offers an insightful – and specific – explication of Krook’s death. Yet in all these readings seems to be a
common theme: Krook’s death fulfils the desire for a sort of purging of Chancery’s corruption – and the legal
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Roberto Esposito’s description of secularization is also helpful in discussing law’s religious function. The political
structure of the West, Esposito argues, has excluded that which it is not (the pagan, the Christian, etc.) and proceeds
to incorporate that which it excludes in its new “secular” structure. In other words, it secularizes (and brings inward)
its sacred outside. The law of Bleak House constantly brings the sacred origin of societal institutions to the fore
(2015, p. 29).
11

system’s by extension.10
My reading, however, takes a different approach. I aver that Krook’s spontaneous combustion exemplifies
what Walter Benjamin describes as “divine violence,” a violence which is “law-destroying,” “expiat[ory],” and
“lethal without spilling blood” (1986, p. 297). Expanding on the concept of “divine violence,” Benjamin cites the
case of “God’s judgment on the company of Korah”:
It strikes privileged Levites, strikes them without warning, without threat, and does not stop short
of annihilation. But in annihilating it also expiates, and a deep connection between the lack of
bloodshed and the expiatory character of this violence is unmistakable…purif[ying] the guilty, not
of guilt, however, but of law. (1986, p. 279)
In God’s judgment on the company of Korah in Numbers 16, the way in which God destroys Korah’s followers––
who revolt against God––is worth note: “And fire came out from the Lord and consumed the 250 men who were
offering the incense” (Numbers 16:35). In this incineration, even more than the earth swallowing the rebels and their
families, we see the apotheosis of Benjamin’s divine violence: that which is “law-destroying,” “expiat[ory],” and
“lethal without spilling blood.”
Is not this much the same story as Krook’s spontaneous combustion? Krook, who is related to the Lord
Chancellor – the true rebel, who has taken God’s place in the religion of London’s law – is annihilated in the very
expiatory fashion which is “law-destroying,” which “purifies the guilty, not of guilt, however, but of law” itself –
the law of false religion (Benjamin 1986, p. 279). Rather than the general idea espoused by critics that Krook’s
death is a displaced purging of Chancery and the legal system’s corruption, Krook’s death is, in fact, the purging of
law’s false religion. In the instance of Krook’s spontaneous combustion, we see that “The Lord Chancellor of that
Court, true to his title in his last act, has died the death of all the Lord Chancellors in all Courts, and of all authorities
in all places under all names soever, where false pretences are made, and where injustice is done” (my emphasis;
479). These “false pretenses,” namely London’s law taking on the role of a religion and the Lord Chancellor
replacing God, are the very same “false pretenses” made by the company of Korah. Therefore, to return to Miss
Flite’s expectation of Judgment – which, incidentally, will remain unfulfilled, as Jarndyce and Jarndyce dissolves in
its own costs – we see that the law cannot confer Judgment: the law’s immanence precludes transcendence. In fact,
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In a slightly different vein, Gordon Bigelow reads Bleak House as a book fundamentally about systems and
circulation – be that semiotic, economic, or domestic (the private space being that which, according to Bigelow, pins
down public circulation) – and alleges that Krook’s death is due to the fact that “the market-system loathes a
hoarder. Stoppage of circulation creates build-up, friction, heat” (2000, p. 596). Jeremy Tambling, too, provides an
insightful reading of Krook’s spontaneous combustion in relation to the Benjaminian concept of allegory (1995).
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the only way to achieve transcendence is for Judgment to be conferred on the law through law-destroying, expiatory
fire. Thus, from apocalyptic fire to spontaneous combustion, we see that in God’s conferral of redemption, it is
indeed the “same death eternally…Spontaneous Combustion, and none other of all the deaths that can be died”
(479).
Krook’s spontaneous combustion, though, also has significant implications for the oikos and oikonomia in
the growing indistinction of the social realm. As Krook admits, “I cannot abear to have any sweeping, nor scouring,
nor cleaning, nor repairing going on about me. That’s the way I’ve got the ill name of Chancery” (63-4). In Krook’s
oikos, there is no oikonomia. More interestingly, we are told (twice!) that Krook’s body, when it is found, lies “on
the ground, before the fire” (476; 479). So Krook, quite literally, perishes before the hearth – the most iconic symbol
of the oikos. In dying before the hearth, it is made apparent that life can no longer be maintained within the
household; Krook’s oikos, for instance, is not only characterized by a lack of oikonomia, but the pervasive influence
of the law as the house’s structure (Krook’s shop being the “dirty hanger-on and disowned relation of the law” [61]).
In the social realm, Krook’s oikos devoid of oikonomia is entirely indistinguishable from the polis’s law.
In Krook’s death, the hearth’s fire is displaced: instead of being located within the bounds of the hearth, the
fire is now operating at the level of the “vicious body” itself (479). And in Krook’s death, the hearth’s fire is
permanently located at the level of this vicious body, so much so that Krook is even described as being on fire
before the incident of spontaneous combustion: Esther initially observes that Krook’s breath issued “in visible
smoke from his mouth, as if he were on fire within” (62). Additionally, when Mr. Guppy tries to wake Krook in
chapter twenty, it is described as “being as easy to wake a bundle of old clothes, with a spiritous heat smouldering in
it” (my emphasis; 303). When Krook is eventually awoken, his “hot breath seems to come towards them [Mr. Guppy
and Mr. Weevle] like a flame” (my emphasis, 304). Krook’s death befits the social realm: rather than the lifemaintaining fire of the hearth and home, Krook is subject to the spontaneous combustion of the law-as-house. To
wit: in the instance of spontaneous combustion one sees the example par excellence of the social realm’s displaced
oikonomia, which manifests itself in a “nation-wide administration of housekeeping.” This nation-wide
administration of housekeeping – which, as we have seen, administers Krook’s shop only in its inability to keep
house – has warped the hearth, the life-maintaining symbol of the oikos. The instance of spontaneous combustion,
then, ultimately reveals that the perversion of the hearth’s fire has not only led to a combustion which cannot
maintain life, but a combustion which is a death-exacting force operating at the level of the body itself. In the
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indistinction of the social realm, and particularly in an oikos which is merely the structure of law, the hearth’s fire
has been transformed into spontaneous combustion. While the hearth’s fire is the symbol of the oikos, spontaneous
combustion is the symbol of the social realm.
IV.

“God made the country, and man made the town” 11

In this fourth and final section, I wish to discuss the role of that shadowy, vaguely threatening presence which has
been hovering around the outskirts of this essay’s argument. Here I refer to London, which, heretofore in this essay,
has taken on a role quite similar to that which it takes on within Bleak House: being at once both the novel’s (and
essay’s) central site, while also being that which is pushed into the reader’s subconscious, as it were. Indeed, I would
argue that Dickens’s London – with its inability to maintain life, disease-ridden streets, dirt, mud and fog – is a
menacing presence.12 But this argument also begs the question: what, specifically, is so anxiety provoking about
Bleak House’s London?
Firstly, I believe London’s structures (both physical and symbolic) contribute to anxiety surrounding the
city. Structures loom over life in London; Hablot Knight Brown’s illustrations, for instance (particularly those
depicting London), often take structures, rather than people, as their subject. And this anxiety – expressed in the way
that structures, rather than life, are the picture’s focal point – is at the heart of Bleak House. More than a city of
people, London is a city of structures – structures which cannot house life and which will, inevitably, outlive life
itself.13 Whether it is the symbolic structure of law, into which “Innumerable children have been born…innumerable
young people have married” and “innumerable old people have died,” or the physical structures which have become
indistinguishable from the law’s power (i.e. Tom-all-alone’s and Krook’s Rag and Bottle Shop), one can be sure that
these structures will outlast the lives within them; lives come and go, but the structure remains (14). Mortal life pales
in the face of London’s seemingly immortal presence.
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Though taken from an eighteenth-century poem, this quotation exemplifies many of the preoccupations at the
heart of Bleak House’s London, which are, ultimately, perennial anxieties concerning the polis and one’s place
within it. And, as I have previously argued, eighteenth century preoccupations linger in Dickens’s novel (Cowper
2015).
12
Andrew Sanders notes the way in which urban environments become the locus of anxieties relating to capitalism
in Dickensian literature: “Engels, and later Marx, came to recognize an inevitable political logic in the fragmenting
social situation they observed; alienation was the result of human relations determined exclusively by the cash nexus
imposed by the development of modern capitalism. Dickens, by contrast, saw the fragments as held together in a
dynamic context which is at once geographical and imaginative” – the Dickensian city (1999, p. 70).
13
Here I take a different approach than Raymond Williams, who, when looking at cities, asks if “This is what men
have built, so often magnificently…is not everything then possible?” (1973, p. 6). Rather than looking at cities’
accumulated might, I choose to look at the ways in which cities elude – and exclude – certain lives.
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In London, one is not only strikingly aware of one’s mortality, but of one’s potential insignificance: anxiety
lurks around the notion that the city is indifferent to the lives it only temporarily houses. Jo, for instance, is
abandoned by the polis’s “nation-wide administration of housekeeping” – his so-called life is a reminder that in the
city, lives “slip through the cracks,” so to speak (“everybody overlooked me until I became that creature that I am!”
[236]). When witnessing the immutable passage of lives through London, one realizes that the city has housed those
who came before, and will house those who come after. In this perpetual state of flux, there is the awareness not
only of the impossibility of having a truly intimate relationship with the site we call London, but also the
impossibility of ever truly knowing the proximate other – the multitude of lives London houses. London as a
crossroads of humanity reveals that life in common is characterized by an intrusive awareness of mortality, a fear of
insignificance, and a lack of knowledge of others and oneself.
These anxieties bring us to the quotation with which I began this section: “God made the country, and man
made the town,” taken from William Cowper’s poem The Task (2015). In Cowper’s poem, which extolls the virtues
of the English countryside, we see the idea (“God made the country”) that God’s presence is felt more deeply in the
country than the town. Dickens, too, would seem to support this notion: in Oliver Twist, he writes, “The memories
which peaceful country scenes call up are not of this world, nor of its thoughts and hopes” (Dickens 2005, p. 286).
Unlike London, where the law is religion, the Lord Chancellor God, and one’s presence merely a temporary blot on
the landscape, the country offers the security of God’s presence and the concomitant assurance that the earth is
man’s inheritance. And these notions – God’s presence and a divine inheritance – also seem to guarantee that life is
endowed with inherent meaning: life is significant because God created man, endowing him with dominion over the
earth (Genesis 1:26). Unlike the city, a communal world to which one can never truly belong, the country is the very
assurance that one does belong; in the so-called “natural world,” the earth belongs, as God ordained, to the
significant subject of Christianity, rather than the insignificant subject of London.
But in the idea of “God made the country, and man made the town,” we also find a contradiction of sorts. If
we agree with Cowper’s assertion that “God made the country,” is it not also true that God made man? And if man,
again drawing on Cowper’s statement, “made the town,” then God also made the town by extension, through man.
For, in what is becoming a trope of Bleak House, we also see the capacity these two supposedly distinct entities –
country and town – have to become indistinguishable: to mimic rather than oppose one another. In fact, I suggest
that in Bleak House we see the capacity for the town to merely imitate the country, as well as the notion that the
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country is rather less of a sanctuary than Dickens (and Cowper) would like it to be. Nature, while often portrayed as
the paragon of God’s creation, can also be cruel, uncontrollable, and fraught with anxiety – in fact, the very presence
of structures is testament to the need for shelter from the elements. If nature, then, is also indifferent to human life,
then we are left with the unsettling notion that perhaps the town mimics the country, rather than perverts it, and that
London’s anxieties cannot solely be contained within the limits of the polis; London, the town, is merely the
extension of an uncaring country.
In Bleak House, then, London is a sort of fictitious depository of anxieties concerning life’s insignificance
in a universe which is, to use John Jarndyce’s words, “rather an indifferent parent” (84). Indeed, the notion of
“London as depository” serves as a way to isolate anxieties pertaining to life’s insignificance and God’s indifference
(or perhaps lack of existence) in the polis. By confining these fears in London, Bleak House can ostensibly prevent
them from disseminating in the outside world. In fact, the novel seems to be asserting that yes, London is a place of
Godlessness, where the law is religion and the Lord Chancellor is God, but only London; outside of London’s
malignant presence, one’s life matters, and mortality can be pushed further away. In Dickens’s depiction of London
as a self-contained depository of anxieties and his privileging of the country over the city, we see an attempt to allay
the fear that perhaps both London and the country are indifferent to human life, and that the universe – in all places
– is indeed an indifferent parent.
Bleak House, though, does more than merely deposit and isolate anxieties in London. The novel, after
quarantining London, then sets out to retroactively redeem and therefore neutralize the polis’s threatening presence
through repetition. Initially, though, the novel seems to express a desire for redemption to be conferred on the polis
in much the same way it was conferred on Krook: through God’s fire (450). Esther observes, “Towards London, a
lurid glare overhung the whole dark waste,” and subsequently describes how London’s “redder light” “engendered
[thoughts] of an unearthly fire, gleaming on all the unseen buildings of the city, and on all the faces of its many
thousands of wondering inhabitants” (my emphasis; 450). But ultimately, as apocalyptic fire is not enacted on this
occasion, Bleak House must retreat into that other, albeit ineffectual, method of conferring redemption: repetition.
Here I am specifically referring to the New Bleak House established at the novel’s end, the New Bleak House in
which, as Kevin McLaughlin rightly says, “there is clearly something unheimlich” (1993, p. 885). Similarly, Carolyn
Dever notes that there is something “strangely sanitary” about the “dream world of the novel’s conclusion” (1995, p.
43). As the above quotations testify, there is something uncanny about the novel’s ending – not only in the repetition
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of the signifier “Bleak House,” but in its retroactive cleansing of the original Bleak House: New Bleak House is a
home purged of the polis’s law in which the old Bleak House was so entrenched.
Why, though, is New Bleak House so uncanny? Perhaps we find the answer to this question in another
uncanny repetition of the novel: the repetition of names.14 Richard and Ada’s son is also called Richard, and “New
Richard,” as Esther tells us, is the means by which God’s plan to restore Ada is realized:
The help that my dear counted on, did come to her; though it came, in the Eternal wisdom, for
another purpose. Though to bless and restore his mother, not his father, was the errand of the baby,
its power was mighty to do so. When I saw the strength of the weak little hand, and how its touch
could heal my darling’s heart, and raise up hope within her, I felt a new sense of the goodness and
the tenderness of God. (911)
In New Richard, God’s plan is revealed: His “Eternal wisdom” and “goodness and tenderness” is shown through the
fantasy of retroactive redemption.15 New Richard is proof that God’s plan can bestow meaning on the seemingly
senseless events of the past. Moreover, God’s presence can only be felt in the new, cleansed Bleak House outside
London: as I have previously noted, the law’s immanence does not allow for God’s transcendence in the city. But in
this assertion of God’s presence outside London, we find a whiff of something slightly too “sanitary,” to use Dever’s
words, about this restoration. Despite the somewhat trite assurance that New Richard’s “errand” was to “bless and
restore his mother, rather than his father,” there is still the overriding impression that New Richard, like New Bleak
House, is meant to retroactively cleanse and redeem the past: New Richard not only restores his mother, but
becomes the meaning of the signifier “Richard”; in other words, New Richard bestows meaning on his father. But, in
fact, this retroactive conferral of meaning would also seem to indicate that the old is not only beholden to the new,
but the new is, unsettlingly, beholden to the old. In this way, while the novel perhaps attempts to bestow meaning
upon Richard through New Richard, by utilizing the same signifier it also, paradoxically, makes New Richard
beholden to Richard, and thus the sanitary retreat of New Bleak House beholden – still – to the power of London’s
law.
And the same could be said for the signifier “Tom.” Bleak House begins with Tom Jarndyce’s suicide,
who, we are told, “blew his brains out at a coffee-house in Chancery-lane” (14). This suicide hangs over the novel,
exemplifying the law which cannot maintain life. Moreover, Tom’s death is never fully buried, as it were: the law’s
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A “theme of uncanniness,” Freud describes, is often the “same name recurring though several generations” (1919,
p. 9).
15
My argument here is indebted to Slavoj Žižek’s The Sublime Object of Ideology, particularly the chapter “You
Only Die Twice” (2008).
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presence denies him his symbolic interment by keeping the lives of those in Jarndyce and Jarndyce – and thus Tom
himself – perpetually suspended. Therefore, there is the need at the novel’s end to put Tom to rest, and Dickens
attempts to accomplish this in much the same way as he has done with “Bleak House” and “Richard” – by reusing
the same signifier in an attempt to overwrite the past. For at Bleak House’s end, there is also a new Tom – Charley’s
younger brother, who “is apprenticed to the miller…and is a good bashful fellow, always falling in love with
somebody, and being ashamed of it” (911). But, like “Bleak House” and “Richard,” there is something rather
uncanny about this repetition which the reuse of the signifier “Tom” cannot quite redeem. Because in attempting to
overwrite the past, the novel again makes the new beholden to the old: instead of interring Tom Jarndyce by
overwriting him with New Tom, New Tom will always be tinged with the law-stained presence of the old.
This, perhaps, is the essence of what is so uncanny about New Bleak House: while attempting to
retroactively bestow meaning, the new is made beholden to the old – so much so that one is left with the impression
that there is still something unheimlich lurking in the “dream world of the novel’s conclusion.” And, even more than
the dream world of the novel’s conclusion, there is something unheimlich lurking in the oikos of New Bleak House –
an oikos which cannot entirely be separated through repetition from the malignant influence of the polis. In fact,
repetition precludes closure, as repetition begets repetition; Steven Connor astutely notes that “the act of repetition
becomes infinitely renewable” (1988, p. 31). Therefore, as Connor asserts, the only possibility of closure must lie in
abandonment – in the novel ending in the middle of a line (1988, p. 31). The last portion of Bleak House, then, is a
last-ditch quest for closure, the closure which cannot be provided by the repetition of the signifier “Bleak House.”
At this point, though, Bleak House cannot truly effect closure or redeem though repetition. This awareness
is not only exemplified by the novel’s abandonment – the only possibility of narrational closure Dickens possesses –
but through the paradoxical and irreconcilable depictions of spaces outside the polis: the country is posited as both a
sanctuary from London and a locus which is inexorably linked to, rather than exempt from, London’s ruined
structures. For instance, I have previously discussed the importance of Jo being “moved on,” as I suggested that Jo
threatens the polis’s law. But if the country is a sanctuary, then would not the instances of Jo being “moved on”
allow for Jo’s retreat to a site of transcendence and salvation? However, I believe that the novel depicts Jo being
moved on as a travesty – as that which epitomizes the law’s inability to house or maintain life. And, as exemplified
by the aforementioned brickmakers’ homes in St. Albans, we see that the country contains the same ruined homes as
London. Both of these aforementioned instances converge when Jo, moved on and ill, eventually ends up in Jenny’s
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– the brickmaker’s wife – home in St. Albans. Here, Jo states that he “can lay amongst the warm bricks,” to which
Charley significantly replies, “But don’t you know that people die there?” (453). But Jo simply returns, “They dies
everywhere. They dies in their lodgings...and they dies down in Tom-all-alone’s in heaps. They dies more than they
lives, according to what I see” (453). It would seem, then, that life cannot be maintained by St. Albans and its
“warm bricks,” one’s oikos (“their lodgings”), or London and its structures of law (“Tom-all-alone’s”), however
much Dickens’s narration tries to reestablish the distinctions which, according to classical thought, separated these
sites. In the social realm, spaces outside the polis take on an incoherent role which cannot be made fully coherent by
Bleak House.
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from the paradoxical portrayal of spaces outside the polis? I posit the
novel’s incoherent depictions of the country are symptomatic of the macrocosmic incoherence of the nineteenth
century – namely, the indistinction of oikos and polis, country and city. This indistinction, and its concomitant
incoherence, is in turn reflected in the incoherence of the novel’s paradoxical depictions of spaces and extra-legal
figures. Jo, for instance, whose life cannot be maintained anywhere due to the social realm’s indistinction,
exemplifies the lack of belonging one has in a community supposedly maintained by the structures of law, but in
which there is only paradoxical legal extra-legality. Unable to be housed within the law, Jo cannot live in the polis –
characterized by legal housekeeping; the oikos – the structure of the polis’s law; or, indeed, the country – a space far
more similar to the polis than the novel would like to concede. While Dickens’s novel perhaps desires coherence, as
seen in the attempt to deposit and isolate anxieties in London, the disparate depictions of that which is “outside” the
polis and Jo himself ultimately show that the novel – and, indeed, the “social realm” itself – cannot achieve
coherence, as the collapsed distinctions of the nineteenth century are mirrored, rather than allayed by, Dickens’s
Bleak House.
So Bleak House cannot avoid incorporating into its own structure external incoherencies, to such a degree
that the novel’s very form becomes a symptom of the social realm.. Simply put: Bleak House, in its abandonment in
the middle of a line, becomes the “unfinished house,” in that both the novel and the house are subject to the threat of
the external, be that the threat of the roof being “put off” or the threat of the novel being left unfinished at the
moment when the reader should be immersed in the supposed sanctity of New Bleak House. By abandoning Bleak
House just when it has retreated into the private sphere, one sees that not only New Bleak House is subject to the
external, but the novel as a whole: what would claim to be a secure textual center is, in fact, entirely subject to that
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which is outside itself (Derrida 1970, p. 2). Rather than offering the hope of an enclosed fictive sphere, the novel’s
form illustrates that structures cannot survive as distinct domains in the social realm: all is the incoherence of the
outside brought inside. Instead of offering coherence, Bleak House takes on much the same role as the home: in the
social realm, neither texts nor homes can remain stable, autonomous entities.
We as readers, left in discomfiting externality of the social realm’s unfinished house, must end by
reckoning with an oikos which cannot be salvaged from the polis. Is Esther right to say, then, that “when the
obligations of home…are overlooked and neglected, no other duties” – from the duties of nation-wide housekeeping,
to the duties of Dickens’s authorship – “can possibly be substituted for them” (76-77)? Certainly, the social realm’s
nationwide housekeeping cannot be substituted for the role of the home. However, having accepted that the oikos
and polis have lost their classical distinctions and that neither the home nor the city can maintain life in the social
realm, can Bleak House offer a way to look beyond attempting to salvage the oikos from the polis in order to see an
innovative, rather than restorative, path forward? I think it can. Bleak House exemplifies that in the cruel selfsufficiency of the social realm, we must seek an alternative to the harms of a polis which cannot maintain life. It
urges us continually to strive toward a more just governance which eschews law’s exclusionary logic entirely, and at
its best passes judgment on the law itself through (metaphorical) expiatory fire. Immersed as we are in the
machinations of the social realm, Bleak House, unfinished as it is, calls for us to begin at its end: to search, amidst
its indistinction, not for a way to salvage the oikos from the polis – this is ultimately, as the novel exemplifies, a
futile goal – but rather to search for a way to affirmatively employ indistinction in the search for a more viable, and
more just, political realm. Ultimately, it is toward this more hopeful future which Dickens’s “unfinished-house” of a
novel points.

20

Bibliography
Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2011. The Kingdom and the Glory, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2013a. Biopolitics and the Rights of Man. In Biopolitics: A Reader, ed. Timothy Campbell and
Adam Sitze, 152-160. Durham: Duke University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2013b. Introduction to Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. In Biopolitics: A Reader,
ed. Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze, 134-144. Durham: Duke University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2015. The Use of Bodies, ed. Werner Hamacher, trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Arendt, Hannah. 2013. Selections from The Human Condition. In Biopolitics: A Reader, ed. Timothy Campbell and
Adam Sitze, 98-133. Durham: Duke University Press.
Benjamin, Walter. 1986. Critique of Violence. In Reflections, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott, 277-300.
New York: Schocken Books.
Bigelow, Gordon. 2000. Market Indicators: Banking and Domesticity in Dickens’s ‘Bleak House.’ ELH 67.2: 589615.
Blake, Kathleen. 1977. ‘Bleak House,’ Political Economy, Victorian Studies. Victorian literature and Culture 25.1:
1-21.
Carens, Timothy L. 1998. The Civilizing Mission at Home: Empire, Gender, and and National Reform in ‘Bleak
House.’ Dickens Studies Annual 26: 121-145.
Connor, Steven. 1988. Economies of Repetition. In Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory, and Text, 15-43. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Cowper, William. 2015. The Task. ed. Henry Morley. Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3698/3698h/3698-h.htm. Accessed 26 July 2018.
Danahay, Martin A. 1991. Housekeeping and Hegemony in ‘Bleak House.’ Studies in the Novel 23.4: 416-431.
Derrida, Jacques. 1970. Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. In Writing and
Difference, trans. Alan Bass, 278-294. London: Routledge.
Dever, Carolyn M. 1995. Broken Mirror, Broken Words: Autobiography, Prosopopeia, and the Dead Mother in
Bleak House. Studies in the Novel 27.1: 42-62.

21

Dickens, Charles. 2005. Oliver Twist. New York: Signet Classics.
Dickens, Charles. 2008. Bleak House, ed. Stephen Gill. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
Dolin, Kieran. 1999. Reformist Critique in the mid-Victorian ‘legal novel’ – Bleak House. In Fiction and the Law:
Legal Discourse in Victorian and Modernist Literature, 71-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dolin, Kieran. 2007. A Critical Introduction to Law and Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Esposito, Roberto. 2015. Two: the Machine of Political Theology and the Place of Thought. New York: Fordham
University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1978. The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction. New York: Pantheon Press.
Freud, Sigmund. 1919. The ‘Uncanny.’ In Imago, trans. Alix Strachey.
Goodlad, Lauren M.E. 2003. Victorian Literature and the Victorian State. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Gottfried, Barbara. 1994. Household Arrangements and the Patriarchal Order in ‘Bleak House.’ The Journal of
Narrative Technique 24.1: 1-17.
Hack, Daniel. 1999. ‘Sublimation Strange’: Allegory and Authority in ‘Bleak House.’ ELH 66. 1 (Spring): 129-156.
Heady, Emily. 2006. The Polis’s Different Voices: Narrating England’s Progress in Dickens’s Bleak House. Texas
Studies in Literature and Language 48.4: 312-339.
Ioannou, Maria. 2020. ‘[O]ur legal fictions’: Law Reform, Jurisprudential Concerns and Benign Aspects of the Law
in Charles Dickens’s Bleak House. Dickens Quarterly 37.2: 131-149.
Kornbluh, Anna. 2019. The Limits of Bleak House. In The Order of Forms: Realism, Formalism, and Social Space,
79-103. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ledger, Sally. 2007. Flunkeyism and toadyism in the age of machinery: from Bleak House to Little Dorrit. In
Dickens and the Popular Radical Imagination, 193-209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leshem, Dotan. 2016. What Did the Ancient Greeks Mean by Oikonomia? Journal of Economic Perspectives.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.1.225.
Lorentzen, Eric G. 2004. ‘Obligations of Home’: Colonialism, Contamination, and Revolt in ‘Bleak House. Dickens
Studies Annual 34: 155-184.
McLaughlin, Kevin. 1993. Losing One’s Place: Displacement and Domesticity in Dickens’s Bleak House. MLN
108.5: 875-90.

22

Miller, D. A. 1983. Discipline in Different Voices: Bureaucracy, Police, Family, and Bleak House. Representations:
59-89.
Morris, Pam. 2001. ‘Bleak House’ and the Struggle for the State Domain. ELH 68.3: 679-698.
Sanders, Andrew. 1999. Dickens and the Spirit of the Age. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
“Strange, adj. 2; 5; 8; v. 1” “Oxford English Dictionary Online.”
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/191244?rskey=clbs02&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. Accessed 25
November 2018.
Tambling, Jeremy. 1995. ‘A Paralyzed Dumb Witness’: Allegory in Bleak House. In Dickens, Violence, and the
Modern State: Dreams of the Scaffold, 71–97. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.
Taylor, Brooke D. 2010. “Spontaneous Combustion: When ‘Fact’ Confirms Feeling in Bleak House.” Dickens
Quarterly 27. 3: 171-184.
Williams, Raymond. 1973. The Country and the City. New York: Oxford University Press.
Žižek, Slavoj. 2008. You Only Die Twice. In The Sublime Object of Ideology, 145-167. London: Verso.

23

